Market risk when hedging a global credit portfolio by Chamizo Cana, Álvaro & Novales Cinca, Alfonso
ISSN: 2341-2356 
WEB DE LA COLECCIÓN: http://www.ucm.es/fundamentos-analisis-economico2/documentos-de-trabajo-del-icaeWorking 
papers are in draft form and are distributed for discussion. It may not be reproduced without permission of the author/s.  
 
 
Instituto 
Complutense 
 de Análisis 
Económico 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Market risk when hedging a global credit portfolio 
 
Alvaro Chamizo  
BBVA 
 
Alfonso Novales 
Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico (ICAE), and  
Department of Economic Analysis, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, 
Universidad Complutense, Madrid, Spain 
 
 
Abstract 
Hedging a credit portfolio using single name CDS is affected by high spread volatility that induces 
continuous changes in a portfolio mark to market, which is a nuisance. Often, the problem is that 
CDS on firms in the portfolio are not being traded. To get around that, a derivative portfolio can be 
hedged by taking a contrary position in a credit index, and we examine in this paper the efficiency of 
such an imperfect hedge. We find over the 2007-2012 period an 80% hedging efficiency for a European 
portfolio, 60% for North American and Japanese portfolios, and around 70% for a global portfolio, as 
measured by the reduction in mark-to-market variance. We also consider sectorial credit portfolios 
for Europe and North America, for which hedging efficiency is not as high, due to their more import- 
ant idiosyncratic component. Taking into account the quality of the credit counterpart improves the 
effectiveness of the hedge, although it requires using less liquid credit indices, with higher transaction 
costs. Standard conditional volatility models provide similar results to the least squares hedge, except 
for extreme market movements. An efficient hedge for a credit portfolio made up of the most idiosyn- 
cratic firms would seem to require more than 50 firms, while the hedge for portfolios made up of the 
less idiosyncratic firms achieves high efficiency even for a small number of firms. The efficiency of the 
hedge is higher when portfolio volatility is high and also when short term interest rates or exchange 
rate volatility are high. Increases in VIX, in the 10-year swap rate or in liquidity risk tend to decrease 
hedging efficiency. Credit indices offer a moderately efficient hedge for corporate bond portfolios, 
which we have examined with a reduced sample of firms over 2006-2018. This analysis also shows that 
the current efficiency of a credit index hedge has recovered at pre-crisis levels. 
Keywords       Market Risk, CDS, Credit Indices, Credit Hedge, Asset Allocation, Systemic 
Risk  
JEL classification:  G01, G12, G13, G14, G15 
 
UNIVERSIDAD 
COMPLUTENSE  
MADRID 
 
 
 
Working Paper nº 1928 
September,  2019 
Market risk when hedging a global credit portfolio
Authors:
Álvaro Chamizo1 2
Alfonso Novales 3 , 4
Abstract
Hedging a credit portfolio using single name CDS is affected by high spread volatility that induces
continuous changes in a portfolio mark to market, which is a nuisance. Often, the problem is that
CDS on firms in the portfolio are not being traded. To get around that, a derivative portfolio can be
hedged by taking a contrary position in a credit index, and we examine in this paper the efficiency of
such an imperfect hedge. We find over the 2007-2012 period an 80% hedging efficiency for a European
portfolio, 60% for North American and Japanese portfolios, and around 70% for a global portfolio, as
measured by the reduction in mark-to-market variance. We also consider sectorial credit portfolios
for Europe and North America, for which hedging efficiency is not as high, due to their more import-
ant idiosyncratic component. Taking into account the quality of the credit counterpart improves the
effectiveness of the hedge, although it requires using less liquid credit indices, with higher transaction
costs. Standard conditional volatility models provide similar results to the least squares hedge, except
for extreme market movements. An efficient hedge for a credit portfolio made up of the most idiosyn-
cratic firms would seem to require more than 50 firms, while the hedge for portfolios made up of the
less idiosyncratic firms achieves high efficiency even for a small number of firms. The efficiency of the
hedge is higher when portfolio volatility is high and also when short term interest rates or exchange
rate volatility are high. Increases in VIX, in the 10-year swap rate or in liquidity risk tend to decrease
hedging efficiency. Credit indices offer a moderately efficient hedge for corporate bond portfolios,
which we have examined with a reduced sample of firms over 2006-2018. This analysis also shows that
the current efficiency of a credit index hedge has recovered at pre-crisis levels.
JEL classification: G01, G12, G13, G14, G15
Keywords: Market Risk, CDS, Credit Indices, Credit Hedge, Asset Allocation, Systemic Risk.
1Álvaro Chamizo: BBVA. e-mail: alvaro.chamizo@bbva.com.
2This article reflects the opinions of the authors, but not the opinion of BBVA.
3Alfonso Novales, Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico (ICAE) and Departamento de Análisis Económico, Facultad
de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Campus de Somosaguas, Universidad Complutense (28223 Madrid). Financial sup-
port by grants ECO2015-67305-P, PrometeoII/2013/015, Programa de Ayudas a la Investigación from Banco de España is grate-
fully acknowledged.
4The authors acknowledge comments received from J. De Juan Herrero
Preprint submitted to Elsevier 27th June 2019
Market risk when hedging a global credit portfolio
Abstract
Hedging a credit portfolio using single name CDS is affected by high spread volatility that induces
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hedged by taking a contrary position in a credit index, and we examine in this paper the efficiency of
such an imperfect hedge. Over the 2007-2012 period we find an 80% hedging efficiency for a European
portfolio, 60% for North American and Japanese portfolios, and around 70% for a global portfolio, as
measured by the reduction in mark-to-market variance. We also consider sectorial credit portfolios
for Europe and North America, for which hedging efficiency is not as high, due to their more import-
ant idiosyncratic component. Taking into account the quality of the credit counterpart improves the
effectiveness of the hedge, although it requires using less liquid credit indices, with higher transaction
costs. Standard conditional volatility models provide similar results to the least squares hedge, except
for extreme market movements. An efficient hedge for a credit portfolio made up of the most idiosyn-
cratic firms would seem to require more than 50 firms, while the hedge for portfolios made up of the
less idiosyncratic firms achieves high efficiency even for a small number of firms. The efficiency of the
hedge is higher when portfolio volatility is high and also when short term interest rates or exchange
rate volatility are high. Increases in VIX, in the 10-year swap rate or in liquidity risk tend to decrease
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1. Introduction
The concentration risk of a credit portfolio comes from two limitations of diversification. The first
one, name concentration, relates to an imperfect diversification of idiosyncratic risk in the portfo-
lio either because of its small size or because of large exposures to specific individual obligors. The
second one, sector concentration, relates to imperfect diversification across the systematic compon-
ents of risk in sectorial factors (see BCBS (2006)). The concentration risk is one of the main worries of
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2credit managers and regulators.1 Indeed, a recent survey regarding credit portfolio managers’ object-
ives suggested a strong emphasis on addressing the structure of the portfolio and risk identification,
showing a slightly lower emphasis on managing regulatory change and specific regulations. Object-
ives cited by more than 50% of bank respondents include addressing portfolio risks through portfolio
structure/concentrations and limits (91%) (see Leung et al. (2017)).
When the exposure exceeds from a given level of concentration determined by its risk appetite
framework, a bank can increase its credit business by appropriately hedging the credit portfolio. Be-
sides, the high volatility of CDS spreads induces continuous changes in a credit portfolio mark to mar-
ket, which is a nuisance. To get around that, a derivative portfolio can be hedged by taking a contrary
position in the CDS of the credit counterparts, when CDS have been issued on them. Unfortunately,
commercial banks often lack single name CDS contracts to be used in a hedge for the credit portfolio
of small and medium businesses, and a macro hedge with a credit index will be needed. Even when
the appropriate CDS contracts exist, the low liquidity of the CDS market, with high costs to entering
and leaving the market, has led Treasury departments at financial institutions to use a very liquid CDS
from a similar firm or a credit index as hedging instrument. An additional difficulty came up when the
financial crisis brought a drastic decrease in volume traded at single name CDS contracts, threaten-
ing to reduce the correlation between single name CDSs and credit indices and to increase the level of
market risk in CVA risk hedging. Indeed, negotiation of credit derivatives declined more or less steadily
since 2007. The negotiated volume fell to $16 trillion at end-December 2014 from a peak of $58 trillion
at end-2007. The market value of CDS also continued to decline, to $593 billion at end-December 2014
in gross terms and $136 billion in net terms.2
As a consequence of the possible lack of CDS contracts, their high volatility, or the imperfect cor-
relation with credit indices, index hedging leaves some market risk that will be even more important
when CDS contracts have not been issued on the counterpart, as it is often the case in commercial
banks’ credit portfolios. Precisely, the objective of this paper is to analyze the empirical market risk
that remains in a CDS portfolio due to the imperfect correlation between the underlying portfolio
to be replicated and the credit index involved in a dynamic replication strategy. Our estimates of
the hedging efficiency of credit indices should serve as a lower bound for evaluating more complex
strategies, as when we face problems related to maturity mismatch, stochastic exposure, or lack of
information on the credit spread of the firm. Even though we work with CDS spreads quoted in the
market, our results can also serve as a good reference for more illiquid CDS or for firms for which CDS
contracts have not been issued.
1As pointed out recently by D. Nouy, among many others: “Banks also need to work on how they calculate and actually apply
limits [...] What we often see is that risk limits are in place but they do not sufficiently constrain risk-taking. The reason is that
the limits are often set so high that there’s virtually no possibility of breaching them. This calls into question the entire risk
appetite framework.” (speech by Danièle Nouy, Chair of the Supervisory Board of the ECB, at the International Conference on
Banks’ Risk Appetite Frameworks, Ljubljana, 10 April 2018).
2The net measure takes account of bilateral netting agreements covering CDS contracts but, unlike gross credit exposures, is
not adjusted for cross-product netting [see BCBS (2015)]. In addition to the financial crisis, the Big Bang Protocol, a standardiz-
ation process for CDS introduced in 2009, was behind the fall in the notional value of CDS contracts Markit (2009).
3We consider equally-weighted regional portfolios for Europe, North America and Japan, as well as
equally-weigthed sectorial portfolios for Europe and North America, as described in the data section
below. We address the following issues: What is the level of market risk? Is market risk higher for North
American portfolios than for European portfolios? Does the effectiveness of the hedge increase when
we consider the firm’s rating in choosing the credit index for the hedge? How does the level of market
risk of corporate debt compares to that of a CDS portfolio?
We start with a single-index least squares hedging strategy based on credit indices: Europe Main
iTraxx, CDX, and Japanese iTraxx, each for the corresponding regional portfolio. Even though the fin-
ancial crisis reduced correlations between single name CDSs and credit indices, we show that they
still allowed for a relatively efficient hedge. Hedge efficiency is higher for the European portfolio than
for North American or Japanese portfolios. Over the whole sample, the hedge achieves a reduction in
the variance of the portfolio’s profit and losses (P&L), measured by the change in its mark-to-market
(MtM) value, of 80% for a European portfolio, 60% for North American and Japanese portfolios, and
around 70% for a global portfolio. The hedge is more efficient in tranquil periods (before 2008 and
after 2010) than during the crisis period. In an extended sample for 2006-2018, albeit with less firms,
we obtain that hedge efficiency has recovered to pre-crisis levels.
Hedging efficiency is heterogeneous across sectors and, for similar sectors, it is higher in Europe
than in North America. For the 2006-2012 period, the median reduction in the portfolio’s profit and
losses is 45% for the European sectors and 30% for the North American sectors, although it is almost
twice as large in tranquil periods (70% and 43%, respectively) than it was during the crisis. Variance re-
duction figures clearly show that sectorial portfolios have much higher idiosyncratic risk than regional
portfolios.
Idiosyncratic risk does not offset among the different CDS contracts even in large size portfolios,
although we show that the efficiency of the hedge depends on the nature of the firms included in the
portfolio. Indeed, if we include the more idiosyncratic firms, we need more than 50 firms to achieve
some significant efficiency, with a Herfindahl concentration index above 2%. On the other hand, if the
portfolio includes the more systemic firms, the hedge achieves significant efficiency even for small
portfolios.
Some alternative strategies improve these results slightly at the cost of using credit indices that are
less liquid, with higher transaction costs. DCC estimates of the hedge ratio are more volatile, leading
to higher entry and exit costs to adjust the hedge continuously. The DCC hedge might be optimal
in market situations of high volatility, while performing similarly to the least squares hedge over the
course of an economic cycle.
Our analysis could also be taken as an element in the estimation of CVA credit risk, even though
we have not considered important factors as the stochastic exposure of derivatives, the netting of the
credit positions or the role of the clearing house. Basel III required the computation of the capital
4charge for CVA risk of each credit position, which can be determined by the CDS spread of the credit
counterpart, taken as the market estimate of the expected loss from the credit trade (see BCBS (2011)
and Hull (2012), Chapter 17).3
The paper is divided into eight sections: In Section 2 we describe our dataset. In Section 3 we
outline the framework we have followed for the hedge and the different hypotheses considered. In
Section 4 we present the results of the hedge methodologies in sectorial and regional portfolios. Sec-
tion 5 contains a variety of tests to analyze the robustness of our results. In Section 6 we analyze the
determinants of hedging efficiency. In Section 7 we evaluate the more recent hedging efficiency and
examine the possibility of hedging corporate bond portfolios using a credit index. Finally, we lay out
the main conclusions in Section 8.
2. Input data
Our sample covers runs from 2006 to 2012, a most relevant period of time for the credit market,
given the events that took place as a consequence of the financial crisis. We use a sector classifica-
tion based on the ICB criteria, (Industry Classification Benchmark), which distinguishes four levels:
Industry, supra-sector, sector and subsector. We use daily data from Markit, a database organized
at the industry level, with eleven industries defined by the ICB criteria: financials, health care, en-
ergy, telecommunication services, basic materials, utilities, industrials, technology, consumer goods,
and consumer services. We consider senior 5-year CDS contracts with the standard currency and re-
structuring clause because of their liquidity and representativeness. We include in our sample CDS
contracts that have a quoted price every day over the 2006-2012 period, with a total of 722 firms. The
different geographical regions contained in the Markit database are: Africa, Asia, Caribbean, East-
ern Europe, Europe, India, Latin America, Middle East, North America, Oceania, Offshore, Pacific and
Supra. However, most of these 722 firms are located in Europe, North America and Asia. Table 1 sum-
marizes the distribution of firms by industry and region.
To hedge equally-weighted sectorial and regional credit portfolios we consider the iTraxx Europe,
iTraxx Europe Crossover and HiVol iTraxx Indices to hedge the European portfolio, the CDX NA IG
and High Yield CDX Indices to hedge the North American portfolio, and the Japan Main Index for
the Japanese portfolio. We will also consider using combinations of credit indices for the hedge. The
iTraxx Europe index is used to hedge European sectorial portfolios, while the CDX NA IG index is used
for sectorial North American portfolios.
(INSERT HERE TABLE 1)
3CVA is the adjustment by credit valuation of a derivative portfolio. In the absence of a CDS for the credit counterpart, a proxy
spread based on the rating, industry and region of each counterparty has been suggested, which can be obtained by estimation
of credit spread curves the rating, sector and region of each counterparty as factors (BCBS (2012)).
5We additionally use a 2006-2018 sample to check on the time evolution of hedge efficiency. This
second sample contains a much lower number of firms because the filters applied to the selection
of firms quickly reduces its number as the sample length increases. We consider CDS and corporate
bond data from these firms to test the possibility that, in the absence of relatively liquid instruments, a
hedging strategy with credit indices might provide some coverage against corporate bond risk as well
as against iliquid instruments as bank loans and financial guarantees.
3. A framework for the hedge
To calculate the mark-to-market of a CDS portfolio we assume that in the initial period we have
invested one monetary unit (euro, US dollar or yen) in each CDS contract in a given region or sector.
We are therefore long in the credit market, as it is natural for a financial institution, and the portfolio
is not changed over the period considered. Hence, our loss in the portfolio will be the result of an
increase in the CDS spread of a given firm, and the natural hedge will be to take the opposite position
in a given credit index.
For the hedging analysis we take weekly averages of CDS spreads for each contract to avoid an
excessive daily market noise, as well as for the six credit indices that we use in the hedge. That leaves
us with 365 weekly data points for CDS spreads.4
Being long in each CDS contract, we approximate the weekly change in mark-to-market of the CDS
for firm i at time t as:5
∆MtM it = −(CDSit − CDSit−1)RDit (3.1)
where CDSit and RD
i
t denote the CDS spread and the risky duration of contract i at time t , with:
RDit =
m∑
t=1
Stτt−1,tDFt (3.2)
where St is the survival probability at time t, τ is the time in years between two consecutive pay-
ment dates, DFt is the discount factor at time t, and m is the total number of payments in the CDS
contract.
To estimate the survival probability St over the time interval [x, x + t], we use its representation
in terms of a “hazard rate” h that we assume to be constant: St = e−
´ t
0
h(u)du = e−ht [see Duffie
and Singleton (1999)]. Under independence between the exogenous default process and the risk-free
rate, the present value of the premium leg of a CDS that is paid continuously would be, PVPremium =
N.CDS.
´ T
0
DFt.Stdt where N and St denote the notional of the contract and the infinitesimal prob-
4We also present below the results obtained with daily data, for comparison.
5For simplification, we are also assuming that we can roll over CDS contracts and credit indices every week.
6ability of survival at time t, respectively. The discount factor over the time interval [x, x + t] can be
written DFt = e−
´ t
0
r(u)du = e−rt, where r is the instantaneous spot risk-free rate, assumed to be con-
stant over that time interval. On the other hand, the present value of the protection leg of a CDS is
PVProtection leg = −N(1 − R)
´ T
0
DFt.dSt, where R is the recovery rate. Each week we estimate h for
each firm in the sample. The recovery rates are taken from the Markit database. We use the 5-year
swap rate for r. Therefore, ignoring any accrued interest, the par (“fair”) CDS spread, CDSp, would be
given by: PVPremium = PVProtecion leg, which implies: CDSp = −(1 − R)
´ T
0
DFtdSt´ T
0
DFtStdt
, giving raise to the
credit triangle relationship: CDSp = (1 − R)h
´ T
0
DFte
−htdt´ T
0
DFte−htdt
⇒h = CDSp1−R [for further details, see White
(2013)].
Thus, if we assume that the payment of the premium leg takes place in continuous time, we can
approximate the risky duration each week over the sample period for a given CDS contract by:
RDi =
ˆ T
0
exp
[− (CDSi/(1−Ri) + r) t] dt = 1− exp [− (CDSi/(1−Ri) + r)T ]
CDSi/(1−Ri) + r (3.3)
where Ri is the recovery rate for contract i at time t, and T is the tenor, which is five years in our case.
For an unhedged equally-weighted portfolio we obtain the weekly change in mark-to-market at t
time as,
∆MtMpt =
1
n
n∑
i=1
∆MtMi (3.4)
where n is the total number of firms in the portfolio.
The weekly change in mark-to-market for each credit index is obtained similarly to the one for
single names in equation (3.1):
∆MtM Indext = −(SpreadIndext − SpreadIndext−1 )RDIndext (3.5)
We calculate the weekly least-squares hedge ratio for an individual firm or a portfolio with respect
to a credit index as,
Betait =
Cov(∆MtM it ,∆MtM
Index
t )
V ar(∆MtM Indext )
= ρ(∆MtM it ,∆MtM
Index
t )
Std.Dev(∆MtM it )
Std.Dev(∆MtM Indext )
(3.6)
Betapt =
Cov(∆MtMpt ,∆MtM
Index
t )
V ar(∆MtM Indext )
= ρ(∆MtMpt ,∆MtM
Index
t )
Std.Dev(∆MtMpt )
Std.Dev(∆MtM Indext )
(3.7)
where ρ denotes the linear correlation coefficient andCov, Std.Dev, denote the covarianza and stand-
ard deviation operators, respectively. The least squares estimate of the ratio can be written as the
7product of two factors: the linear correlation coefficient between the portfolio and the credit index,
and the relative volatility of portfolio and index. Hence, a beta estimate above 1 necessarily means
that the volatility of spreads for the portfolio or sector under consideration is higher than the ob-
served credit index volatility. On the other hand, a perfect correlation between credit portfolio and
index does not imply a unit hedge ratio, the beta coefficient then being equal to the relative volatility
of the portfolio and the credit index.
Using rolling windows we end up with 313 weekly estimates forBetai orBetap, running from Janu-
ary 2007 to December 2012. The weekly change in mark-to-market at t time for a hedged portfolio or
for a single CDS contract is obtained as:
∆M˜tM it = ∆MtM
i
t −Betait(∆MtM Indext ) (3.8)
∆M˜tMpt = ∆MtM
p
t −Betapt (∆MtM Indext ) (3.9)
Finally, we can calculate the accumulated mark-to-market at time T for an unhedged or a hedged
portfolio by aggregating over time the weekly change in mark-to-market from a given point in time,
which we will usually take it to be the beginining of the hedging exercise.
4. Hedging results
In this section we describe the hedging analysis of equally-weighted sectorial and regional portfo-
lios.
4.1. Sectorial portfolios
Figure 1 shows sectorial medians of the correlations between individual contracts and the European
iTraxx, taken as hedge credit index, during 2007-2012. They experienced a drastic elevation in July 2007
for all sectors, reflecting the increased correlation across the credit market at that point. Correlations
decreased after the Lehman crisis, possibly due to the fact that a fall in volume traded in single names
at the time reduced the connection between individual CDS spreads and the credit index. Correlations
with the credit index increased again in 2010, having a second reduction episode during the European
sovereign crisis in the summer of 2011. In the last part of the sample, the technology sector decoupled
from the rest of the sectors as well as from the credit index.
(INSERT HERE FIGURE 1)
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(INSERT HERE FIGURE 2 )
Sectorial hedge ratios for the European portfolio are represented in Figure 2 as the median of beta
estimates for the individual firms in each sector. Hedge ratios across sectors display more important
differences than correlation coefficients, reflecting the large differences in sectorial spread volatility.
Energy and health care were the sectors with the lowest beta during the crisis, while basic materials
was the sector with the highest beta, although with a noticeable decrease from 2010 onwards. The
evolution of the financial sector beta is particularly interesting. It was very low before the crisis but it
experienced a sudden increase at the beginning of the summer of 2007, before the first symptoms of
the crisis became apparent. In September 2009 hedge ratios for the financial sector started again an
increasing trend, while median betas for the other sectors were either stable or decreasing. Clearly, the
global crisis was overall a financial global crisis. These results are also interesting for asset allocation
purposes, as they give a clear sign of the level of systemic risk in the different sectors.
(INSERT HERE TABLE 2)
Table 2 shows sectorial hedge ratios, the sectorial correlation with the credit index (iTraxx) and
the relative volatility of sectorial MtM and index MtM for European firms. In spite of being median
values across the firms in the sector, they provide a quite approximate decomposition of sectorial
hedge ratios.6 At the level of the sector, correlations with the credit index generally increased during
the financial crisis, and remain after the crisis above their pre-crisis levels.7
Finally, Figure 3 displays hedge ratios for the North American portfolio, and their decomposition
between index correlation and relative volatility is presented in Table 3 Here, the financial sector had
the highest beta since the end of 2007, while the health care sector was the one with the lowest beta,
as in Europe. The time evolution of the correlations with the index (Figure 4) is similar to the one ob-
served in Europe although at lower levels, suggesting that, in spite of being constructed from credit
securities issued by North American firms, CDX does not provide as good a hedge for the US credit
portfolio as iTraxx for the European portfolio. That might be an indication of larger idiosyncratic com-
ponents of credit risk in North American firms than in European firms.
(INSERT HERE FIGURE 3)
(INSERT HERE TABLE 3 )
(INSERT HERE FIGURE 4)
Table 4 shows the efficiency of hedging sectorial portfolios with a credit index, as measured by
the reduction in weekly mark-to-market variance. A moderate hedging efficiency can be achieved for
6That is, the hedge ratio is approximately equal to the product of the correlation between the sector median and the market
index, and their relative volatility. This would hold as an exact equality for any individual firm.
7This may be consistent with the growing fear in the financial industry we mentioned in the Introduction, that the correlation
between CDS indices and single-name contracts was in danger of breaking down as a consequence of diminished single-name
traded volumes and an increase in the notional outstanding in index CDS products.
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European portfolios over the full sample, except for the technology and utilities sectors. However,
we can see that the efficiency was much higher before the crisis. The hedge performed again better
after the crisis, without reaching the pre-crisis efficiency levels for a while. Changes in correlations
over the three periods were not large, while some of the increases in sector volatility relative to the
index were quite substantial during the crisis. Hedging efficiency is lower for North American sectors.
Furthermore, the sectors with the most or the least efficient hedge are different in North America and
Europe.
(INSERT HERE TABLE 4 )
The correlation coefficients in the lower part of Table 2 show that European hedge ratios are mainly
determined by the relative volatility between the sector and the index, with the correlation between
them playing a minor role. Even of more consequence is the fact that the hedging efficiency seems to
be determined by the sectorial correlation with the credit index, with relative volatility being almost
irelevant. Hedging efficiency is also unrelated to the size of the hedge ratio. This has been consistently
the case for the three subperiods considered, and specially in the crisis and post-crisis periods. The
result is not so clear for the North American portfolios, with hedging efficiency being related to both,
the porfolio-index correlation and their relative volatility, although the former effect is dominant.
4.2. Regional portfolios
4.2.1. European CDS portfolio analysis
We now examine weekly profit and losses (P&L) for the European equally-weighted CDS port-
folio of 246 firms together with the P&L that would have prevailed under a weekly hedge for the
period 2007-2012. Figure 5 is a scatterplot of returns of the unhedged portfolio versus the returns
that would have been achieved with a hedging position in the iTraxx index, as given by the product
Betait
(
∆MtM iTraxxt
)
. Similarity between both returns indicates a good hedge. In the graph we dis-
tinguish between the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods. The huge deterioration in the credit
market during the crisis is evident, with occasional losses over 100 basis points (b.p.) for the whole
European portfolio. Downside market movements are smaller than those of the unhedged portfolio,
and the hedge with the iTraxx Europe index works well overall. The main problem with this hedge is
indicated by the points indicating a loss from the CDS portfolio simultaneously with a profit from the
credit index used in the hedge. That would imply a double loss, as we would have been long in the
credit portfolio and short in the credit index.
(INSERT HERE FIGURE 5 )
Figure 6 displays cumulative weekly P&L during the period 2006-2012 for the unhedged and hedged
European credit portfolios.8 The graph reflects the general increase in credit spreads over 2006-2012.
8We have ignored the discount factor when aggregating the P&L because we want to focus on the pure effect of the hedge of
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The devastating effect of the recent crisis in terms of market losses is clear. It is also noteworthy that
after some weeks of very high losses, we usually observe an opposite market reaction, possibly because
of some active measures from regulators and governments. In terms of hedging efficiency, we must
pay attention to three features: i) the size of the wedge between the P&L of the hedged and unhedged
portfolios, ii) whether the P&L line is smoother for the hedged than for the unhedged portfolio, and
iii) the distance between the hedged portfolio line and the horizontal axis at zero, which can be taken
as an indication of residual market risk. We can see that losses are clearly reduced by hedging with
iTraxx, although the immunization of the portfolio is incomplete, leaving unsecured market risk.
(INSERT HERE FIGURE 6)
It is also interesting to observe that the hedge worked better in the pre- and post-crisis periods
than during the crisis. Over the full sample, the efficiency of the one-index hedge, as measured by
the reduction in portfolio variance was 81%, with reductions of 83%, 74% and 91% over the pre-crisis,
crisis and post-crisis periods, as shown in Table 5. As expected, the regional portfolio provides a much
better compensation of idiosyncratic risks than the sectorial portfolios.
(INSERT HERE TABLE 5)
Finally, Figure 7 shows the empirical density (bars, right axis) and distribution functions (lines,
left axis) of weekly P&L for the unhedged and hedged European portfolios. The red and blue lines
give us the historical probability of having a loss higher than the value shown in the X-axis. These
estimates are very relevant to establish a VaR limit or a stop loss on market risk. We can choose a
desired probability level on the left axis (95%, for instance), bring it to the red and blue lines, and the
projection on the X-axis would give us the weekly P&L VaR estimate.9
(INSERT HERE FIGURE 7)
The efficiency of the hedge can also be seen in Table 6, where we present the estimated probabil-
ities of a fall in mark-to market larger than one or two standard deviations of the unhedged portfolio.
For the European portfolio, the hedge achieves a sharp reduction in the probability of a weekly fall
larger than one standard deviation, from 15.8% to just 3.2%. The probability of a fall larger than two
standard deviations comes down to almost zero. The reduction can be seen to be very important in
the three subperiods, and particularly in the last period. Before the crisis there was a 6% incidence of
a fall larger than one standard deviation, which would have been avoided with the hedge.
(INSERT HERE TABLE 6)
the credit portfolio and the size of market risk.
9To be precise, some interpolation would be needed.
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4.2.2. North American CDS portfolio analysis
For the North American portfolio, with 360 firms, the results of the hedge show a pattern similar to
the European portfolio. Even though it is more diversified than the European portfolio in terms of the
number of firms, the results of the hedge are not as good as in Europe. The scatterplot of weekly mark-
to-market changes and the correlation coefficients in Figure 8 already advanced that the effectiveness
of the hedge is higher during the non-crisis periods than during the crisis. Indeed, the reduction in
volatility from the one-index hedge was 60% over the full sample, with reductions of 76%, 55% and 70%
in the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods, below the ones achieved for the European portfolio in
each of the three subperiods. Even though this was a global crisis, the increase in spreads during the
crisis was larger in the North American than in the European portfolio. The hedged portfolio seems to
work well, achieving a clear reduction of the long- and short-term fluctuations in P&L of the unhedged
portfolio. Figure 9 shows how the hedge concentrate weekly changes in mark-to market into a small
interval around the origin, indicating the reduction in the level of risk. Howerver, the level of market
risk over the sample period was also larger than in Europe. That bespeaks for the fact that North
America was at the time of the Lehman Brothers default the epicenter of the crisis, with a high level of
idiosyncratic risk. In fact, market risk at the end of the sample remained high, around 500 b.p., twice
as large as in Europe.10
(INSERT HERE FIGURE 8)
(INSERT HERE FIGURE 9 )
(INSERT HERE FIGURE 10)
The mark-to-market of the hedged North American portfolio has a 5.5% probability of experien-
cing a weekly fall larger than one standard deviation of the unhedged portfolio over the full sample,
versus a 13.2% probability for the unhedged portfolio. Such a reduction was again very important in
the three subperiods. However, this measure of hedge effectiveness is not as good as the one for the
European portfolio, again expressing a higher level of unsecured market risk in North America. That
suggests that there is higher undiversifiable credit risk in the North American than in the European
credit market, for which credit indices do not offer a good hedge.
4.2.3. Japanese CDS portfolio analysis
Results for the Japanese credit portfolio, made up of 116 firms, are qualitatively similar to the other
two regions, showing the global nature of the credit crisis. Losses from the unhedged portfolio were
often below 100 b.p., although it is also true that the level of Japanese spreads is also generally lower
than in the rest of the world.
10This is measured by the distance between the P&L for the hedged portfolio (green line) and the horizontal axis in Figure 10.
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The unhedged and hedged portfolios both had almost zero P&L before the crisis, indicating stable
credit spreads. They experienced the large increase in credit spreads during the 2006-2012 period
that is also observed in the other regions. The hedge was quite successful in isolating the portfolio
from the increased widening of spreads after 2007, with the accumulated P&L of the hedged portfolio
being well above the one for the unhedged portfolio. It also achieved a low level of market risk, well
below the levels in Europe and North America. Up to 2009 the effectiveness of the hedge seems higher
than in European and North American portfolios. However, after 2009, the degree of immunization
with respect to the P&L of the unhedged portfolio was minimal, and in 2012 market risk was at a level
similar to Europe. The reduction in volatility was 60% over the full sample from the one-index hedge,
with reductions of 63%, 60% and 59% during the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods. The overall
efficiency of this hedge is similar to that in North America, just because of the better performance
during the crisis. In the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods, the hedge did not work as well as in North
America or Europe.
The hedge barely reduces the probability of a fall larger than one standard deviation in mark-to-
market to 7.1% over the full sample, higher than the similar probabilities for the European and North
American portfolios. On the other hand, the probability of a fall above two standard deviations is
1.6% for the Japanese hedged portfolio, below the similar probability for the North American portfolio,
showing that the hedge worked quite well on the extreme tail [see Table 6]
4.2.4. Global CDS portfolio analysis
As a last exercise, we show the results of the aggregate global portfolio, considering an equal expos-
ure to each firm in Europe, North America and Japan. We ignore the effect of foreign exchange rates, as
we want to focus just on the ability to immunize a global credit portfolio against credit market fluctu-
ations.11 It is relevant that we are now considering a portfolio of 722 firms, a higher diversification that
should lead us to expect that the hedge should work better than in single regions. However, in general
terms, the results are a bit worse than in the European portfolio, due to the influence of the North
American firms in the global portfolio and to the high correlation among the worst individual firms
from different regions at the end of 2008 (Lehman default). Consequently, the benefits from diversi-
fication decrease. The efficiency of the one-index hedge was 71% over the full sample, with variance
reductions of 82%, 67% and 80% over the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods.
The wedge between the accumulated P&L for the unhedged and hedged portfolios is analogous
to the one in Europe. The same can be said for the level of market risk, as measured by the level of
accumulated P&L for the hedged portfolio. The probability of having a large mark-to-market fall is
again sharply reduced by the hedge, in parallel with the reductions for Europe and North America,
11This is clearly an approximation. An interesting question would be to examine the possibility of hedging both against credit
market risk and currency risk, but that goes well beyond the scope of this paper.
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and the level of market risk falls between the levels obtained for these two regions. [see Tables 5 and
6].
5. Robustness analysis
We analyze in this section the possibility of increasing the effectiveness of the hedge by alternative
modifications of the least-squares single-index hedge described in the previous section.
5.1. Hedging with ratings in mind
We start by considering the possibility of increasing the effectiveness of the hedge by using credit
indices according to the credit quality of each firm in the portfolio. We will now use the iTraxx and the
HiVol iTraxx indices in the hedge for the European credit portfolio, instead of just using iTraxx, and
the CDX and High Yield CDX indices for the North American portfolios, rather than hedging only with
the CDX index. Again, we assume that the liquidity of both indices is enough to balance our hedge
weekly without any entry or exit cost. Our hedging strategy is now as follows: in a given week, if the
firm has an investment grade we use the iTraxx index to hedge its CDS. Otherwise we use the HiVol
iTraxx index. In the case of the North American portfolio, we operate similarly, using as an alternative
hedge for the non-investment grade CDS contracts the High Yield CDX index. We also consider the
Markit iTraxx Europe Crossover index as hedging instrument because of its higher liquidity.
Hedging effectiveness improves somewhat relative to the one-index hedge for the European, North
American and global portfolios, but not for the Japanese portfolio. For instance, the reduction in the
variance of weekly changes in mark-to-market for the global portfolio over the full sample increases
from 71% to 79% [see the ’Two-index’ rows in Table 5]. The probability of having a weekly loss higher
than one or two standard deviations is slightly reduced relative to the use of a single index. The in-
creased efficiency of the two-index hedge arises mainly in the crisis and post-crisis subperiods, be-
ing particularly important for the North American and global portfolios, and somewhat less for the
European portfolio. This is clearly a hedging strategy that deserves a detailed cost-benefit analysis by
risk managers. Not surprisingly, given the portfolio composition, the two-index hedge for the global
portfolio behaves as in Europe and North America, producing a significant gain in the crisis and post-
crisis periods, but not during the crisis.
5.2. Dynamic conditional correlation hedging
The previous analyses have considered a rolling window of 52 weeks to estimate the hedging ratios,
so that the correlation and variance estimates have been allowed to change over time. However, a
more structured analysis of time-variation in the parameters of the joint distribution for the portfolio
and the hedging asset could benefit from conditional variance specifications. In this section we use
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a Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC) model under an Exponentially Weighted Moving Average
(EWMA) specification Engle (2002) to estimate volatilities and the conditional correlation between
the portfolio and the credit index, in order to see if the use of conditional moments can improve the
results of the least squares hedge.
If we denote by rit the return on the CDS contract of firm i at time t , we assume the return condi-
tional variance σ2it to follow the EWMA model:
σ2it = λσ
2
it−1 + (1− λ)(rit−1 − µi)2, i = 1, 2, ...n (5.1)
where µi is the conditional mean of returns and n is the number of firms in the sample. The DCC
model uses standardized returns on different assets: zit = (rit−µi)/σit, zjt = (rjt−µj)/σjt to generate
the auxiliary variables:
qij,t+1 = (1− λ)zitzjt + λqij,t, ∀i, j (5.2)
and the conditional correlation can be estimated as:
ρij,t+1 =
qij,t+1√
qii,t+1
√
qjj,t+1
(5.3)
Given an unhedged portfolio and the credit index used in the hedge, we get the covariance and the
kedge ratio relative to the market index as:
Covi,index,t+1 = ρi,index,t+1
√
σ2i,t+1σ
2
index,t+1 (5.4)
Betai,index,t+1 =
Covi,index,t+1
σ2index,t+1
(5.5)
where the conditional volatility for the index is assumed to also follow an EWMA structure sim-
ilar to the one for individual firms. In this exercise we use again a one-index hedge, with iTraxx as
market index for the European portfolio, CDX as market index for the North American portfolio, and
the Japanese iTraxx as market index for the Japanese portfolio. We assume qi0 = 1 ∀i, and we take
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the average of the product zi,tzindex,t of the first 52 observations as initial value qi,index,0. We establish
the parameter λ = 0.94 based on RiskMetrics, Longerstaey and Spencer (1996). Finally, we also take
the standard deviation of the first 52 observations as initial value for σi0. Our estimations cover the
2006-2012 period, as with least squares estimates.
Table 5 shows that there are not noticeable differences in the performance of the DCC hedge relat-
ive to the least-squares hedge in any of the three subperiods considered or in the full-sample for any
of the regional portfolios or for the global portfolio. For the European and North American portfolios,
the conditional hedge yields slightly better results than those obtained by the least-squares hedge in
specific days of extreme volatility, but without any discernible effect on time aggregate measures of
hedging efficiency.12 This should be expected, as the DCC model estimates an instantaneous variance
at time t by weighting more heavily the recent observations. As a consequence, DCC estimates react
more quickly than least squares estimates. This becomes evident when comparing the sectorial me-
dian hedge ratios estimated by the DCC model, which turn out to be more irregular than least-squares
hedge ratios in Figure 2. DCC estimates also reduce slightly the probability of getting a large fall in
mark-to-market for the European portfolio, but not for the North American portfolio.
5.3. Daily hedge results
We analyze now the possibility of rebalancing the hedge daily assuming again that the cost of entry
to the market is zero. In this case we estimate the hedge beta for each firm using a single credit index
with a window of 252 daily data. As shown in Table 5, the daily hedge performs relatively well for
the European and global portfolios, with a noticeable reduction in the variance of weekly CDS spread
changes, especially in the periods before and after the crisis. The daily hedge does not perform so well
for the North American portfolio or the Japan portfolios. The hedge is again able to reduce significantly
the probability of a fall in CDS spreads larger than one or two standard deviations.
The numerical reduction in mark-to-market variance is not strictly comparable with the results
obtained under the weekly hedge, but the lower variance reduction, the increased complexity of com-
puting a daily hedge, the illiquidity of this market and the higher trading costs suggest against using a
daily hedge, except if we are strongly interested in reducing the probability of a large occasional fall in
the CDS portfolio.
5.4. Hedging portfolios of different size
In this section we examine how the efficiency of the least-squares hedge changes with the number
of firms in the portfolio using the sample of North American firms. Hedging results for small portfolios
will depend on the nature of the firms included in the portfolio, so we have run two different exercises.
12As it can be observed in graphs similar to those presented for the least-squares hedge, which we do not include in the paper.
5.4 Hedging portfolios of different size 16
First, we consider portfolios with 5, 25, 50, 100, 225 and 360 firms, with portfolio components being
selected starting from the most idiosyncratic firms. Second, we perform the analysis starting from the
least idiosyncratic firms. Clearly, the hedge should yield better results for small portfolios in the last
case.
To estimate idiosyncratic components, we use as reference the first principal component of the
weekly changes in CDS spreads for the whole sample of North American firms, as an indicator of the
aggregate risk in the credit market (as is done in Longstaff et al. (2011)). The correlation between the
weekly changes in CDS spread and the principal component is used to rank firms, a low correlation
indicating the more idiosyncratic ones.13 Table 7 shows the results when we start bulding portfolios
including the most idiosyncratic firms. For each portfolio, we show the percent reduction in portfolio
mark-to-market variance. Throughout each period, we used 52-week windows to estimate a hedge
ratio. The least squares hedge ratio is estimated each week and the hedge is adjusted accordingly.
As in previous sections, we consider the full sample as well as the same three subperiods: pre-crisis,
up to the end of 2007, crisis: 2008 and 2009, and post-crisis: 2010, 2011 and 2012. Hedging results
were again generally much better before and after the crisis that during the financial crisis. The hedge
does not achieve any improvement for small portfolios, and it starts being effective when we include
the 50 most idiosyncratic firms, corresponding to an approximate Herfindahl index of 2%. For that
portfolio, the hedge achieves a reduction in MtM variance above 30% in the more tranquil periods.
Hedging results improve with the number of CDS contracts in the portfolio, although there seems to
be no further gain once we include 225 firms. For the largest portfolio of 360 firms, the hedge reduces
mark-to-market variance by 60%. When we start building portfolios with the least idiosyncratic firms,
the percent reduction in volatility is essentially independent from the number of firms, and the table
shows that even for the small portfolio of 5 firms the percent reduction in mark-to-market variance is
already similar to the one achieved with the large portfolios made up of the most idyiosincratic CDS
contracts. The degree of market concentration is not important in these portfolios. Figure 11 shows
the reduction in mark-to-market variance as a function of the number of firms as we include in the
portfolio either the more idyosincratic or the less idiosyncratic CDS contracts. If we constructed port-
folios choosing at random from our sample of 260 North American firms, the reduction in volatility
would fall at some point between these two lines.14
(INSERT HERE TABLE 7)
(INSERT HERE FIGURE 11)
Table 8 shows the probability that each portfolio may suffer a loss above one or two standard devi-
ations of the mark-to-market of the unhedged portfolio. The incidence of high losses prior to the crisis
13Chamizo and Novales (2016)use this principal component in a regression model to obtain a decomposition of credit risk
into systematic, sectorial and idyosincratic components.
14Even a uniform, purely random selection of firms might translate into an interesting probability distribution on variance
reduction.
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is eliminated by the hedge in portfolios of 50 or more names. During the crisis the frequency of losses
above one standard deviation seems to be increasing with the portfolio size, but the hedge reduced
significantly such incidence. After the crisis the incidence of large losses was lower than during the
crisis, and the hedge was again successful in reducing their number.
(INSERT HERE TABLE 8)
6. Determinants of hedging efficiency
As a summary of the results in previous sections, the wedge between the 20-week volatility of the
unhedged and hedged equally-weighted portfolio of the 360 US CDS in our sample in Figure 12 signals
the efficiency of the hedge. The reduction in volatility became less important when the crisis started,
until the end of 2008, after the Lehmann Brothers bankruptcy. It improved from that point until Oc-
tober 2010, to decrease sharply again up to a minimum close to zero on May-June 2011, the time of
the EU bailout to Portugal and the downgrade of S&P to Greece. The reduction in variance quickly
recovered from there up to a level of around 50%.
(INSERT HERE FIGURE 12)
Thus, the hedging efficiency of the credit portfolio can be seen to experience significant change
over time that could be related to some of the variables more relevant for the works of the financial
markets and hence for the expectations of economic agents, conditioning their decisiones and the
evolution of the economy. It seems natural to consider short- and long-term interest rates, volatility
indicators as well as some measure of liquidity. As portfolio characteristics we include the current
volatility and the portfolio size. Pooling the weekly data for the six portfolios made up by a differ-
ent number of North American firms that were considered in the previous section, we estimated the
regression model,
Reduct = 0.0010 + 18.26
(12.9)
V olatti + 9.71
(17.9)
L3mt − 3.50
(7.4)
Sw10t − 10.31
(8.2)
Dliqt−
−019
(3.3)
V IXt + 0.71
(4.1)
V olExt + 0.11
(41.2)
Sizeit + 10.9
(13.3)
Crisist + uˆt, adjR
2 = 0.74
(6.1)
where Reduc is the percent reduction in volatility, as measured by the standard deviation of weekly
changes in the portfolio MtM, Volat is the current level of volatility of the unhedged portfolio, in both
cases estimated with a 52-week window, L3m denotes the 3-month Libor rate, Sw10 is the 10-year
swap rate in USD, Dliq is the absolute difference between the 3-month Libor and the USD Overnight
Indexed Swap (OIS) 3-month rate as a proxy for liquidity risk in the US, VIX denotes the US index of
implied volatility of stock market options, and VolEx is the volatility of the 3-month forward Euro/USD
exchange. Size is the number of firms in the portfolio and Crisis is a dummy variable taking a value of
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1 during the crisis period, and zero otherwise.15 The regression achieves an adjusted R2 of 0.74. The
percent reduction in volatility increases with the number of firms included in the portfolio, an increase
in 50 firms reducing volatiliy by 5 additional percentage points. The reduction in volatility is also 11
percentage points larger in tranquil periods. The percent reduction is larger when portfolio volatility
is high and also when short term interest rates or exchange rate volatility are high. An increase in
VIX, the 10-year swap rate or the level of liquidity risk, ceteris paribus, tends to decrease the percent
reduction in volatility achieved by the hedge. However, it is not advisable to interpret the estimated
coefficients individually, since the Libor rate has a linear correlation of 0.87 with the Swap rate, and
the exchange rate volatility, the VIX index, and the liquidity risk indicator are also correlated among
them. Thus, collinearity leads to lack of precision in individual coefficient estimates, even if allowing
for a precise estimation of the global explanatory power of the regression.16
7. Risk analysis with corporate bond data
Througout the financial crisis, banks often invested in corporate bonds to get a better return in
their portfolios. However the market for corporate bonds is well known to be rather illiquid, and we
examine in this section whether a credit index could be used to hedge such a portfolio. Another mo-
tivation for this analysis comes from the need to cover the risk involved in loans, credit lines, and bank
guarantees, for which there natural hedging instruments do not exist. We take bond data for the June
2006-June 2018 period from firms currently included in the MARKIT CDX.NA.IG.31 12/23 index.17 We
also want to use this sample to evaluate the more recent level of efficiency of the hedge provided by
credit indices for credit portfolios. Unfortunately, the use of a longer 2006-2018 sample drastically
reduces the number of firms satisfying our filters. All data are in USD. At any given point in time we
chose for each firm the bond closest to 5-year maturity, since we want to compare the results with
those obtained from 5-year CDS spreads. We excluded bonds for which we did not have data at least
90% of the weeks over the sample period, as well as bonds with maturity below one year. We selec-
ted senior unsecured bullet bonds to avoid the price of the bond being affected by the existence of a
callable option, and we only considered issues over 500 million USD to have some guarantee of liquid-
ity. These two filters help us to interpret the bond spread as reflecting credit quality, although there
will still be some basis risk remaining. We started with an initial group of 125 firms, those for which we
had historical prices in either BGN or CBBT, and 1043 bonds. After application of the filters we ended
up with a portfolio of 45 Investment Grade bonds from the US. With the filtered data we obtained the
asset swap spread, calculating the weekly average of the available daily data over any given week. Fi-
nally, we adjusted the asset swap by the spread between the swap curve and the 5-year Treasury, so
15A higher value of Dliq would indicate high systemic risk and low liquidity. Before the financial crisis, this variable was close
to zero.
16Collinearity also inflates the variance of estimates, so that having statistically significant coefficients in the presence of high
collinearity is particularly interesting.
17Chamizo et al. (2019) use this same data set to compare the value at risk estimates of both portfolios.
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that the spread is referred to the risk-free curve. We estimated missing weekly spread data by taking
the previous observation adjusted by the average spread change observed that week for the firms in
the portfolio. We follow the framework described in Section 3 to compute hedging efficiency, using as
credit index the CDX North American Investment Grade.
Figure 13 shows that the pattern of volatility was very similar in both markets.18 Volatility sharply
increased at the end of March 2008, well before the first evidence of the financial crisis was noticed,
and started to decrease in March 2009. Volatility increased again in February 2011 because of evidence
on the European sovereign debt crisis, coming back to more normal values one year later, in February
2012. Finally, volatility increased again in July 2015, reaching their peak in February 2016 and decreas-
ing afterwards, as a sign of the increased risk brought about by a global stock market selloff due to
several factors: the Chinese stock market turbulence, in which the SSE Composite Index fell 43% in
just over 2 months between June 2015 and August 2015, culminating in the devaluation of the yuan,
a fall in petroleum prices, the Greek debt default in June 2015, the effects of the end of quantitative
easing in the United States in October 2014, a sharp rise in bond yields in early 2016, and finally, in
June 2016, the United Kingdom European Union membership referendum, 2016, in which Brexit was
voted upon.
(INSERT HERE FIGURE 13 )
Table 9 summarizes the hedging results. We can see that the volatility of the unhedged corporate
and CDS portfolios was quite similar, with the exception of the pre-crisis period, when the variance
of the CDS portfolio was more than 20% above the volatility of the bond portfolio. The hedge is quite
successful for the credit portfolio, with an average variance reduction of 60%, which becomes signi-
ficantly higher during the more tranquil periods. The hedge for the credit portfolio was less efficient
during the financial crisis, with a decrease in variance of 55%, versus a reduction of 71% before and
after the crisis. The hedge would have also been successful for the bond portfolio, with a 40% reduc-
tion in variance, a similar level over the three periods considered.
(INSERT HERE TABLE 9 )
8. Conclusions and open questions
To analyze the possibilities of hedging CDS portfolios with credit indices we have estimated the
level of market risk that remains after such a hedge. We have considered regional (European, North
American, Japanese) credit portfolios as well as a global portfolio, and we have examined the pre-
crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods separately. We have also examined the efficiency of the hedge for
sectorial credit portfolios in Europe and North America. We have evaluated the efficiency of a least-
18Estimated as the standard deviation of returns in a rolling window of 52 weeks
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squares hedging strategy based on weekly observations, under alternative hedging strategies.
A single-index least-squares hedge achieves a significant reduction in P&L variance. The probabil-
ity of having an extreme loss is also sharply reduced by the hedge. However, significant market risk re-
mains even in well-diversified portfolios, with more than seven hundred CDS contracts, showing that
their idiosyncratic components do not compensate with each other. Results are similar for the differ-
ent regions as well as for the global portfolio, although the hedge seems to be more effective in Europe
and Japan than in North America. There are noticeable differences in the efficiency of the hedge across
sectors both in Europe and North America, an important result regarding asset allocation decisions.
Hedging efficiency seems to be closely related to the correlation between a given sector and the credit
index, moreso than to the volatility of the sector relative to the hedging credit index, or to the size of
the hedge ratio. The hedge was somewhat less effective during the financial crisis due to decreased
correlations between single names and credit indices, although it still achieved a significant reduction
in risk. Using a strategy that takes into account the quality of the credit counterpart improves the ef-
fectiveness of the hedge, although it requires using less liquid credit indices, with higher transaction
costs. Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC) estimates of the hedge ratio might be optimal in a high
volatility market, while performing similarly to the least-squares (least squares) hedge over the course
of an economic cycle. DCC hedge estimates are however more volatile, leading to higher entry and
exit costs to adjust the hedge continuously.
The hedge efficiency increases with the number of firms in the portfolio, although the level of ef-
ficiency depends on the nature of the firms included in the portfolio. If we include the most idio-
syncratic firms, we may need more than 50 names to achieve some significant reduction in P&L vari-
ance. On the other hand, if the portfolio includes the least idiosyncratic firms, we achieve significant
efficiency even with small portfolios. Thus, our analysis has clear implications for credit risk man-
agement, since the sectorial strategy should depend on the risk decomposition of firms in a given
sector. Indeed, it would seem appropriate to impose a maximum exposure to sectors where firms
have a large systematic risk component while being relatively flexible about the distribution inside the
sector, since a small idiosyncratic component would not allow us to extract the benefits of diversifica-
tion by increasing the number of firms in the portfolio. On the contrary, in a sector where firms have
large idiosyncratic risk component, we should avoid having a high name concentration, since a better
diversification would reduce the total risk of the portfolio.
In addition to the effect of the size of the portfolio, the percent reduction in the variance of the
portfolio achieved by the hedge is higher when portfolio volatility is high and also when short term
interest rates or exchange rate volatility are high. An increase in VIX, in the 10-year swap rate or in
liquidity risk, ceteris paribus, tends to decrease the percent reduction in volatility achieved by the
hedge.
A relevant implication from our analysis is that some basis points should be charged to the price
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of financial credit products in terms of unhedgeable risk. A natural beginning would be to estimate
the expected loss in basis points as a function of a proxy portfolio, adjusted by maturity, to be added
as an extra charge to the price of derivatives. From the point of view of regulators, we could think of
using a historical percentile of a P&L distribution, as estimated in this paper, as lower bound for the
level of market risk that should be added in terms of capital and monitor that risk among the financial
institutions in order to prevent future problems.
Jump-to-Default risk cannot be ignored as delta hedging is a partial hedge and its effectiveness
is predicated on a continuous adjustment of the hedge ratio. Therefore, if a single firm jumped to
default, we would not be able to adjust the hedge ratio appropriately, and the defaulted credit exposure
would not be fully covered, resulting in a loss. Thus, name concentration can be partially, but not
fully eliminated. In general, it will be easier for portfolio management and hedging to reduce sector
concentration than name concentration, unless CDS have been issued for that firm. The possibility
of calibrating a jump model to evaluate the effectiveness of the credit index hedge in case of Jump-to-
Default of a firm not included in the index remains as an open question. It would also be interesting
to carry out the analysis in this paper under alternative assumptions, like non-zero transaction costs,
stochastic exposures, or using an alternative strategy involving the simultaneous use of several credit
indices. Another alternative would consider hedging the credit portfolio with credit and equity indices,
since the latter are highly liquid assets and show high correlation with credit indices, suggesting that
such a strategy might reduce the level of market risk.
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Appendix
Table 1: Distribution of CDS contracts by industry and region
Industry/Region Europe Japan North America Total
Basic materials 17 13 33 63
Consumer goods 33 23 54 110
Consumer services 35 16 52 103
Energy 6 3 33 42
Financials 69 17 61 147
Health care 4 0 24 28
Industrials 30 24 46 100
Technology 5 8 16 29
Telecommunication services 20 3 14 37
Utilities 27 9 27 63
Total 246 116 360 722
Notes: The table shows the number of CDS contracts in our sample, by sector and region.
Table 2: Hedge ratio decompositions: European portfolio
Sector
Full sample Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis
H.R. Rho R.Vol. H.R. Rho R.Vol. H.R. Rho R.Vol. H.R. Rho R.Vol.
Basic materials 1.36 0.67 2.12 1.06 0.72 1.54 1.70 0.68 2.59 1.35 0.69 2.10
Consumer goods 0.55 0.70 0.92 0.57 0.66 0.85 0.63 0.70 1.01 0.34 0.72 0.57
Consumer services 0.66 0.68 1.27 0.77 0.64 1.47 0.77 0.63 1.37 0.55 0.72 0.83
Energy 0.42 0.59 0.65 0.15 0.47 0.31 0.35 0.61 0.59 0.42 0.66 0.60
Financials 0.97 0.66 1.47 0.45 0.54 0.76 0.96 0.66 1.52 1.09 0.72 1.43
Health care 0.27 0.65 0.41 0.20 0.55 0.36 0.38 0.71 0.53 0.19 0.66 0.30
Industrials 0.92 0.69 1.29 0.73 0.67 1.09 0.98 0.67 1.53 0.73 0.73 0.97
Technology 0.65 0.62 1.26 0.62 0.58 1.34 0.74 0.61 1.18 0.64 0.63 0.93
Telecommunication services 0.64 0.70 0.92 0.72 0.66 1.26 0.67 0.71 0.93 0.55 0.76 0.73
Utilities 0.44 0.65 0.60 0.42 0.60 0.73 0.43 0.63 0.63 0.35 0.68 0.53
Correlations with hedge ratio 0.33 0.96 0.90 0.94 0.15 0.99 0.20 0.99
Correlation(Rho, R.Vol) 0.25 0.77 0.08 0.14
Correlations with hedging efficiency 0.05 0.68 -0.05 0.25 0.58 0.08 0.02 0.95 -0.03 0.07 0.83 0.05
Notes: H.R.= hedge ratio, Rho = correlation, R.Vol = volatility of unhedged credit portfolio relative to the credit index. The table shows hedge
ratios, correlations betweens ectors and credit index, and sectorial volatility relative to the credit index. The last three rows show: correlations of
Rho and R.Vol with the hedge ratio, Correlation between Rho and R.Vol., and correlations of the three variables with hedging efficiency in Table 4.
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Table 3: Hedge ratio decompositions: North American portfolio
Sector
Full sample Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis
H.R. Rho R.Vol. H.R. Rho R.Vol. H.R. Rho R.Vol. H.R. Rho R.Vol.
Basic materials 0.61 0.59 1.31 0.38 0.49 0.84 0.69 0.61 1.16 0.71 0.59 1.45
Consumer goods 0.99 0.58 1.62 0.92 0.56 1.49 0.73 0.60 1.29 0.88 0.60 1.61
Consumer services 0.81 0.62 1.48 0.67 0.53 1.33 0.74 0.64 1.16 0.85 0.62 1.40
Energy 0.46 0.54 1.16 0.30 0.50 0.73 0.50 0.52 1.23 0.64 0.61 1.39
Financials 1.02 0.60 1.74 0.42 0.54 0.87 1.05 0.57 1.78 1.23 0.79 1.67
Health care 0.29 0.48 0.84 0.24 0.36 0.93 0.29 0.50 0.83 0.31 0.54 0.74
Industrials 0.64 0.56 1.30 0.41 0.44 1.18 0.54 0.58 1.08 0.51 0.63 1.18
Technology 0.61 0.55 1.14 0.24 0.38 1.40 0.46 0.56 0.77 1.14 0.62 1.86
Telecommunication services 0.48 0.49 1.27 0.60 0.47 1.86 0.42 0.46 0.94 0.29 0.58 0.78
Utilities 0.46 0.50 0.95 0.43 0.51 0.79 0.48 0.47 1.05 0.55 0.53 0.92
Correlations with hedge ratio 0.83 0.95 0.68 0.56 0.62 0.91 0.74 0.93
Correlation(Rho, R.Vol) 0.83 -0.05 0.35 0.72
Correlations with hedging efficiency 0.63 0.83 0.54 0.10 0.61 -0.36 0.74 0.86 0.49 0.68 0.81 0.58
Notes: H.R.= hedge ratio, Rho = correlation, R.Vol = volatility of unhedged credit portfolio relative to the credit index. The table shows hedge ratios,
correlations between sectors and credit index, and sectorial volatility relative to the credit index. The last three rows show: correlations of Rho
and R.Vol with the hedge ratio, Correlation between Rho and R.Vol., and correlations of the three variables with hedging efficiency in Table 4.
Table 4: Hedging efficiency: Sectorial portfolios
Europe North America
Full sample Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis Full sample Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis
Basic materials 49% 70% 39% 54% 32% 49% 28% 33%
Consumer goods 52% 76% 42% 55% 33% 45% 31% 39%
Consumer services 43% 66% 36% 58% 37% 51% 33% 41%
Energy 41% 54% 33% 50% 25% 42% 21% 41%
Financials 43% 69% 37% 56% 30% 51% 28% 53%
Health care 53% 75% 48% 53% 27% 39% 14% 34%
Industrials 47% 71% 41% 60% 34% 43% 28% 39%
Technology 36% 57% 32% 33% 29% 43% 25% 35%
Telecommunication services 53% 78% 43% 60% 22% 30% 18% 27%
Utilities 39% 70% 33% 52% 25% 40% 23% 32%
Notes: Percent reduction in mark-to-market variance when hedging sectorial portfolios with a credit index (iTraxx for Europe,
CDX for the US)
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Table 5: Hedging efficiency: Regional portfolios
Europe North America Japan Global
Full sample
One-index: 81% 60% 60% 71%
Two-index (High vol/High yield) 85% 72% 60% 79%
Two-index (Crossover) 83% 72% 60% 78%
DCC hedge 81% 60% 59% 71%
Daily hedge 71% 42% 42% 63%
pre-crisis
One-index 83% 76% 63% 82%
Two-index (High vol/High yield) 89% 73% 63% 83%
Two-index (Crossover) 89% 73% 63% 82%
DCC hedge 84% 76% 62% 83%
Daily hedge 81% 28% 50% 55%
crisis
One-index 74% 55% 60% 67%
Two-index (High vol/High yield) 79% 67% 60% 74%
Two-index (Crossover) 76% 67% 61% 74%
DCC hedge 71% 56% 59% 66%
Daily hedge 65% 33% 42% 57%
post-crisis
One-index 91% 70% 59% 80%
Two-index (High vol/High yield) 93% 85% 59% 89%
Two-index (Crossover) 92% 85% 59% 89%
DCC hedge 91% 70% 58% 81%
Daily hedge 76% 59% 41% 71%
Notes: The table shows the percent reduction in the variance of weekly changes in the MtM of regional portfolios achieved by
the hedge. ’One-index’ refers to the hedge obtained from a single index. ’Two-index’ refers to the hedge based on two CDS
indices as described in the paper. ’DCC hedge’ refers to the hedge with the DCC-EWMA model. ’Daily data’ refers to results
obtained using daily data (Unhedged/Hedged portfolios). The hedge is estimated each week using a 52-week window.
26
Table 6: Probability of a large weekly fall in MtM
Europe North America Japan Global
Full sample 1σ 2 σ 1 σ 2 σ 1 σ 2 σ 1 σ 2 σ
Unhedged 15.8% 5.8% 13.2% 4.2% 9.0% 3.2% 15.1% 4.2%
One-index 3.2% 0.3% 5.5% 1.9% 7.1% 1.6% 4.5% 1.0%
Two-index (High vol/High yield) 2.9% 0.6% 4.2% 1.3% 7.1% 1.6% 3.9% 0.3%
Two-index (Crossover) 2.9% 0.6% 4.2% 1.3% 7.1% 1.6% 3.9% 0.3%
DCC hedge 2.9% 0.0% 5.8% 1.6% 6.8% 1.0% 4.8% 1.0%
Daily data (Unhedged) 4.8% 0.6% 5.8% 0.6% 3.2% 1.3% 4.8% 0.6%
Daily data (Hedged) 1.9% 0.0% 6.1% 1.9% 1.3% 0.6% 2.6% 0.6%
pre-crisis
Unhedged 6.0% 0.0% 6.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 6.0% 0.0%
One-index 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Two-index (High vol/High yield) 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Two-index (Crossover) 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
DCC hedge 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Daily data (Unhedged) 0.0% 0.0% 2.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Daily data (Hedged) 0.0% 0.0% 4.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
crisis
Unhedged 21,2% 7.7% 23.1% 7.7% 19.2% 6.7% 24.0% 7.7%
One-index 6.7% 1.0% 11.5% 4.8% 14.4% 4.8% 10.6% 2.9%
Two-index (High vol/High yield) 6.7% 0.0% 9.6% 3.8% 14.4% 4.8% 9.6% 1.0%
Two-index (Crossover) 7.7% 1.9% 9.6% 3.8% 14.4% 4.8 10.6% 1.0
DCC hedge 5.8% 0.0% 11.5% 4.8% 13.5% 2.9% 9.6% 2.9%
Daily data(Unhedged) 1.9% 1.0% 3.8% 0.0% 1.9% 0.0% 3.8% 1.3%
Daily data (Hedged) 0.0% 0.0% 2.9% 1.9% 0.1% 0.0% 1.9% 0.6%
post-crisis
Unhedged 15.3% 6.4% 8.9% 3.2% 5.1% 1.9% 12.1% 3.2%
One-index 1.9% 0.0% 3.2% 0.6% 4.5% 0.0% 1.9% 0.0%
Two-index (High vol/High yield) 0.0% 0.0% 1.9% 0.0% 4.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Two-index (Crossover) 0.6% 0.0% 1.9% 0.0% 4.5% 0.0% 0.6% 0.0%
DCC hedge 1.9% 0.0% 3.8% 0.0% 4.5% 0.0% 3.2% 3.2%
Daily data (Unhedged) 8.3% 0.6% 8.3% 1.3% 5.1% 2.5% 7.0% 1.3%
Daily data (Hedged) 3.8% 0.0% 8.9% 2.5% 2.5% 1.3% 3.8% 0.6%
Notes: The table shows the probability of a weekly fall larger than one or two standard deviations of the unhedged portfolio.
’One-index’ refers to the hedge obtained from a single index. ’Two-index’ refers to the hedge based on two CDS indices as
described in the paper.’DCC hedge’ refers to the hedge with the DCC-EWMA model. ’Daily data’ refers to results obtained using
daily data (Unhedged/Hedged portfolios). The hedge is estimated each week using a 52-week window.
Table 7: Percent reduction in the variance of weekly MtM changes: North American firms
More idiosyncratic firms Less idiosyncratic firms
Number of firms 5 25 50 100 225 360 5
Full sample -6% -4% 11% 46% 56% 60% 61%
pre-crisis -7% -58% 37% 83% 79% 77% 64%
crisis -9% 2% 8% 41% 52% 57% 60%
post-crisis -2% 10% 34% 58% 66% 70% 73%
Notes: The table shows the percent reduction in variance of weekly MtM changes of each portfolio as a consequence of hedging
with the CDX index, when we consider the more idiosyncratic firms. The last column corresponds to the portfolio of the 5 less
idiosyncratic firms. The hedge is estimated each week using a 52-week window.
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Table 8: Probabilities of a large weekly change in MtM for portfolios of different size
Number of firms 5 25 50 100 225 360
Whole sample
Unhedged (1 σ) 9% 10% 6% 14% 14% 14%
Hedged (1 σ) 11% 11% 6% 8% 6% 6%
Unhedged (2 σ) 5% 4% 3% 5% 5% 4%
Hedged (2 σ) 5% 4% 3% 3% 3% 2%
Pre-crisis
Unhedged (1 σ) 6% 4% 2% 8% 6% 6%
Hedged (1 σ) 6% 8% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Unhedged (2 σ) 2% 2% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Hedged (2 σ) 2% 4% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Crisis
Unhedged (1 σ) 6% 14% 11% 20% 21% 20%
Hedged (1 σ) 10% 14% 11% 11% 10% 9%
Unhedged (2 σ) 4% 5% 4% 8% 6% 6%
Hedged (2 σ) 4% 6% 4% 5% 4% 4%
Post-crisis
Unhedged (1 σ) 15% 8% 2% 6% 8% 7%
Hedged (1 σ) 15% 8% 2% 6% 5% 4%
Unhedged (2 σ) 8% 3% 1% 3% 4% 4%
Hedged (2 σ) 8% 2% 1% 2% 2% 0%
Notes: The first two rows in each panel show the probability of a weekly change in MtM larger than one standard deviation of the
unhedged portfolio. The last two rows show the probability of a weekly change in MtM larger than two standard deviations.The
hedge is estimated each week using a 52-week window.
Table 9: Percent reduction in the variance of weekly MtM changes in CDS and bond portfolios: North American firms (2007-
2018)
CDS portfolio Bond portfolio
Unhedged Hedged Variance Unhedged Variance
reduction reduction
Full sample 2.38% 1.50% 60% 2.27% 1.76% 40%
6/2007 -5/2008 2.18% 1.17% 71% 1.79% 1.39% 40%
6/2008 - 12/2010 4.11% 2.76% 55% 3.84% 2.98% 40%
1/2011 - 6/2018 1.40% 0.73% 72% 1.43% 1.12% 39%
Notes: Mark-to-market variance of the unhedged and hedged portfolios over the full sample and three subperi-
ods. The left panel refers to CDS data, while the right panel refers to corporate bond data. In both cases, data
comes from 45 North American CDS firms, as explained in the paper.
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Figure 1: Sectorial linear correlations between sectorial portfolios and credit index: Europe. 2007-2012
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Note: The figure displays the time evolution of sectorial linear correlation coefficients between European firms and the credit
index. At each point in time, the graph shows the median correlation for CDS firms in each sector.
Figure 2: Sectorial median beta estimates: Europe. 2007-2012
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Note: The figure displays the time evolution of sectorial beta estimates for European firms: 2007-2012. At each point in time,
the graph shows the median value of beta estimates for CDS firms in each sector.
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Figure 3: Sectorial median beta estimates: North America. 2007-2012
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Note: The figure displays the time evolution of sectorial beta estimates for North American firms: 2007-2012. At each point in
time, the graph shows the median value of beta estimates for CDS firms in each sector.
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Figure 4: Sectorial linear correlations between sectorial portfolios and credit index: North America. 2007-2012







	









	

















	

















	

















	

















	

















	











 
  !"
 !" #$
% &$!"
& '
Notes: The figure displays the time evolution of sectorial linear correlation coefficients between North American firms and the
credit index. At each point in time, the graph shows the median correlation for CDS firms in each sector.
Figure 5: Weekly profits and losses for the European CDS and hedge portfolios (246 firms) in basis points, 2007-2012
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Fitted ∆MtM values from the Index hedge (in bp.) (Hedged Portfolio)
Pre-Crisis Period (2007)  (corr.=0.93)
Crisis Period (2008-2010)  (corr.=0.88)
Post-Crisis Period (2011-2012)  (corr.=0.95)
Note: The graph shows a scatterplot of weekly P&L for the unhedged European credit portfolio and for the hedge portfolio.
The latter is obtained as the product of the beta of the credit portfolio by the P&L of the credit index. A high correlation
betwwen them suggests a good hedge. P&L are shown in basis points (corr.=correlation coefficient).
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Figure 6: Accumulated profits and losses in basis points for the European CDS portfolio (246 firms), 2007-2012
Note: Accumulated P&L for the unhedged and hedged European credit portfolios since January 2007 in basis points.
Figure 7: Empirical density and distribution functions for weekly P&L for the European CDS portfolio (246 firms), 2007-2012.
Note: Empirical density and distribution functions for weekly P&L for the European CDS portfolio: 2007-2012. The two lines
display the distribution P&L functions: the left axis indicates the probability that P&L are less or equal to the mid-point
of each interval in the horizontal axis. The vertical bars show the relative frequency of P&L in each interval (right axis).
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Figure 8: Weekly profits and losses for the North American CDS and hedge portfolios in basis points. (360 firms), 2007-2012
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Crisis Period -2008-2010-  (corr.=0.75)
Post-Crisis Period -2011-2012-  (corr.=0.83)
Note: The graph shows a scatterplot of weekly P&L for the unhedged North American credit portfolio and for the hedge port-
folio. The latter is obtained as the product of the beta of the credit portfolio by the P&L of the credit index. A high
correlation betwwen them suggests a good hedge. P&L are shown in basis points (corr.=correlation coefficient).
Figure 9: Empirical density and distribution functions for weekly P&L for the North American CDS portfolio (360 firms), 2007-
2012
Note: Empirical density and distribution functions for weekly P&L for the North American CDS portfolio: 2007-2012. The two
lines display the distribution P&L functions: the left axis indicates the probability that P&L are less or equal to the mid-
point of each interval in the horizontal axis. The vertical bars showthe relative frequency of P&L in each interval (right
axis).
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Figure 10: Accumulated profits and losses in basis points for the North American CDS portfolio. (360 firms), 2007-2012
Note: Accumulated P&L for the unhedged and hedged North American credit portfolios since January 2007 in basis points.
Figure 11: Percent reduction in MtM variance as a function of the size of the portfolio
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Note: The graph shows the estimated reduction in MtM variance from hedging a portfolio of North American CDS firms with a
contrary position in the CDX index, as the number of firms included in the portfolio increase. The red line corresponds
to portfolios made up of the less idiosyncratic firms, while the blue line corresponds to portfolios made up of the more
idiosyncratic firms.
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Figure 12: Volatility: hedged and unhedged portfolio of 360 North Amerian firms
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Note: Annual volatility (annualized standard deviation) of the unhedged and hedged portfolios made up of the 360 North
American firms: 2007-2012.
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Figure 13: CDS and Bond Volatility: hedged and unhedged 45-firm portfolio
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Note: The first figure shows the annual volatility (annualized standard deviation) of the unhedged and hedged portfolios made
up of the 45 firms: 2008-2018. The second figure shows the annual volatility (annualized standard deviation) of the
unhedged and hedged portfolios made up of the same 45 firms: 2008-2018.
